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JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN EMPLOYMENT
CASES
JUDGE AS WITNESS BEFORE HIMSELF
Walter Lee Hearne v. Wayne Sherman, Health Director of
Chatham County
By: Monique Shamun*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 23, 1999, in Walter Lee Hearne v. Wayne Sherman,
Health Director of Chatham County, and Chatham County, an equally
divided North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals by holding that the determination by final
agency decision maker Wayne Sherman (Sherman) did not violate
employee Walter Lee Hearne's (Hearne) due process rights to fair
determination.1 The Court held that, although final agency decision
maker Sherman was the same individual that allegedly terminated
employee Hearne, the final agency determination preserved Hearne's
due process rights because the decision was rendered pursuant to the
procedures required in section 126-37 of the North Carolina General
Statutes (N.C.G.S.).2 It also held that, because the material facts
surrounding Hearne's termination were undisputed, the decision maker
was unbiased, since he did not need to assess his own credibility. ' The
Court thus concluded that, when an impartial decision maker renders a
final agency determination pursuant to section 127-37, the
.Second year law student, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
1516 S.E.2d 864 (1999).
2N.C.G.S. section 126-37 (bl) governs appeals involving local government
employees. It provides in pertinent part: "The local appointing authority shall, within 90 days
of receipt of the advisory decision of the State Personnel Commission, issue a written, final
decision either accepting, rejecting, or modifying the decision of the State Personnel
Commission. If the local appointing authority rejects or modifies the advisory decision, the
local appointing authority must state the specific reasons why it did not adopt the advisory
decision. A copy of the final decision shall be served on each party personally or by certified
mail, and on each party's attorney of record." Hearne, 516 S.E.2d at 866-67.
'Id. at 866.
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determination does not viol ate due process rights to fair determination. 4
The decision has no precedential value because no majority
existed. One of the Judges, who was about to leave the Supreme Court
to work in a firm representing Hearne, recused himself. A petition for
reconsideration has been filed with the appointment of a new Justice.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hearne was employed as an Animal Control Officer with the
Chatham County Health Department until January 1995. ' Sherman,
Health Director of Chatham County and final agency decision maker,
sought Hearne's resignation due to negative publicity surrounding
allegations that Hearne improperly euthanized a litter of puppies. 6 On
August 31, 1995, Heame filed a petition for a contested case hearing in
the Office of Administrative Hearings, alleging that Sherman
discharged him without a hearing and without just cause. 7 In contrast,
Sherman contended that Hearne voluntarily resigned. 8
On January 16-17, 1996, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
conducted ahearing on Hearne's claim.9 In his recommended opinion
to the State Personnel Commission (SPC), the ALJ determined that
Hearne's resignation was involuntary and recommended his
reinstatement. 1°  On August 5, 1996, the SPC subsequently
recommended Hearne's reinstatement." On October 31, 1996,
Chatham County Health Director Sherman, acting as the "local
appointing authority" pursuant to N.C.G.S. section 126-37(b 1),12
declined to adopt the SPC's determination and decided, in a final
agency determination, that Heame had voluntarily resigned.13
4Id. at 867.
Id. at 865.
61d.
'Id.
'Id.91d.
'Id.
"Id.
'
2N.C.G.S. section 126-37(b I) provides in pertinent part: "In appeals involving local
government employee's subject to this chapter...the decision of the State Personnel
Commission shall be advisory to the local appointing authority." N.C.G.S. § 126-37(b 1).
'rHearne 516 S.E.2d at 865.
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Heame sought judi cial review in the Chatham County Superior
Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. section 150B-43. 14 On March 20,1997, the
Superior Court reversed Sherman's decision and ordered Hearne's
reinstatement. 5 Sherman and Chatham County filed a notice of appeal
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 6 The Court of Appeals, in an
unpub lished, divided opinion, reversed and remanded the Superior
Court decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the
conclusion that Hearne voluntarily resigned.'
7
Hearne then appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court."
III. NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Substantial Evidence and Adequate Findings
The central issue before the North Carolina Supreme Court was
whether director Sherman violated Hearne's due process rights when
he reached the final agency decision. 9
Sherman, in exercising his control as local appointing authority
pursuant to N.C.G.S. section 126-37(b 1), determined that Hearne had
voluntarily resigned from his position as Animal Control Officer .20 The
basic facts surrounding Hearne's separation from employment are
14N.C.G.S. section 150B-43 governs the right to judicial review. It provides: "Any
person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all
administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial
review of the decision under this article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is
provided by another statute, in which case the review should be under such other statute.
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any person from invoking any judicial remedy available
to him under the law to test the validity of any administrative action not made reviewable under
this article." North Carolina General Statutes § 150B-43 (1985). Hearne, 516 S.E.2d at 865.
5Id.
16d.
"Id.
"Id.
1In his notice of appeal, Hearne asserted a substantial constitutional issue which
queried whether his due process rights were violated when an agency renders a final decision
based on his own testimony. On December 3, 1998 the Court granted Sherman's motion to
dismiss Hearne's claim on the constitutional issue. Accordingly, the Court did not address the
issue of whether a county health director is the proper person to serve as local appointing
authority under section 126-37(b 1). Id.
2 D1d.
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undisputed.2" During the Administrative Hearing, Hearne testified
about a phone conversation with Sherman concerning his resignation.22
Sherman stated that he was concerned with the negative publicity
surrounding the animal shelter and requested Hearne's resignation.23
Hearne replied, "well, you've got it."24 Hearne, being hurt and upset,
also told Sherman to ask other people for their resignations and asked
Sherman to get all the county "stuff' off of his property. 25 Hearne's
wife heard Hearne's end of the phone conversation and corroborated
Hearne's testimony.26 Neither Hearne nor Sherman dispute the
foregoing testimony regarding the material facts surrounding Hearne's
resignation.27 Hearne argued that he was forced to resign and thus his
resignation was involuntarily.28
A reviewing Court must apply the "whole record test" in
reviewing agency determinations. 29 The "whole record test" requires
the Court to determine whether the agency's determination is supported
by substantial evidence in light of the entire record.3 ° Thus, the Court's
scope of review is limited to the agency's fact findings.3
Consequently, the Court must defer to the agency's findings if a Court
finds that it is reasonable in light of all the evidence in the record, even
if the Court could reasonably find otherwise. 32
Therefore, the Court limited its review to Sherman's findings of
fact by applying the "whole record test. 33 Three members of the Court
held that despite the fact that final agency decision maker Sherman was
the same individual that allegedly terminated employee Hearne, the
final agency determination preserved Hearne's due process rights
because Sherman rendered his decision pursuant to section 126-37
21id. at 866.
22Id.
23Id.
24Id
23Id.
261d"
27 1d"
2Sd.
"Id. (citing Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Edu., 292 N.C. 406 (1977)).3 0Hearne 516 S.E. 2d 866, citing Thompson.
"Id.
'
21d. (citing Powell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 347 N.C. 614 (1998)).
33Hearne, 516 S.E. 2d At 865.
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N.C.G.S.34 These Justices found that the testimony of Heame and his
wife was substantial evidence supporting the finding that Hearne
voluntarily resigned. 35 They also found that since neither Hearne nor
Sherman dispute the material facts surrounding Hearne's resignation,
the decision by Sherman was unbiased because he was not put in a
position to asses his own credibility. 36 The Justices thus concluded
that, when an impartial decision maker renders a fair agency
determination pursuant to requirements in section 127-37, the
determination does not violate due process rights to fair
determination.37
B. Administrative Procedure Act Recusal Provision
The Supreme Court also noted that Hearne failed to take any
measures to protect himself against a perceived bias on the part of
Sherman.38 Specifically, Heame did not exercise his statutory right to
seek Sherman's recusal under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).39 The Court further noted that there is no provision in the
Administrative Procedure Act requiring the final agency decision maker
to voluntarily recuse himself.4 °
IV. DISSENTING OPINIONS
The first "dissent' '  held a more narrow view of the issue
-4Id. at 866-67.
3 Id. at 866.
36Id.
371d. at 866-67.
3 Id. at 866.
3 
.C.G.S. section 150B-36(a) governs recusation of a final agency decision maker.
It provides: "Before the agency makes a final decision, it shall give each party an opportunity
to file exceptions to the decision recommended by the Administrative Law Judge, and to
present written arguments to those in the agency who will make the final decision or order. If
a party files in good faith, a timely and sufficient affidavit or personal bias or other reason for
disqualification of a member of the agency making the final decision, the agency shall
determine the matter as a part of the record in the case, and the determination is subject to
judicial review at the conclusion of the case."
401d. at 866.
"The dissent is referred to as such, despite the awkward position of an equally
divided Court that cannot itself resolve the issues.
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presented in this case.42 The dissent phrased the issue as whether an
Appellate Court reviewing a final agency decision is bound by findings
of fact made by a final agency decision maker based on findings of his
own credibility.' 3 The dissent submitted that the Court is not bound by
agency determinations under those circumstances because an unbiased,
impartial decision maker is an imperative part of due process. 4' The
dissent stated that due process requires the Court to assess an agency
decision by balancing the individual's interests against the State's
interests."5 The Court has not done so in this case. 46
The second dissent found that the majority opinion "infringe[d]
upon a cornerstone principle of procedural due process. "' It noted that
there were numerous material facts in dispute because, based on the
same record, the ALJ and SPC came to a different conclusion than the
Court. 4' Furthermore, the second dissent pointed out the erroneous
finding of the Court that Sherman was not put in a position to assess his
own credibility, where Sherman's determination was based on a finding
that "Mr. Sherman's testimony [regarding disputed facts] [was]
credible."' 9 According to the dissent, the Court did not consider the
substantial evidence supporting the finding of the lower tribunals that
Hearne did not voluntarily resign. 0
Regarding Hearne's failure to recuse Sherman as decision
maker, the second dissent noted that the Court neglected to mention
that the APA does not provide for an alternative arbitrator in the event
of recusal.1' Therefore, any attempt by Hearne to recuse Sherman
would have been fruitless. 5 2 Moreover, the Court did not consider
evidence in the record which reflected that Sherman did not afford
Hearne adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the final
42 d. at 867.
431d.
44Id. (citing Crump v. Bd. Of Edu., 326 N.C. 603 (1990)).4sId. (citing Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Edu. Ass'n, 426 U.S.
483,494 (1976)).
46Hearne, 516 S.E.2d At 867.
471d.
4SId. at 868.
491d.
SOld.
"Id. at 869.
52Id.
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agency decision because Sherman mailed his final decision to Hearne
almost three months after the SPC adopted the AL's recommendation
to reinstate Hearne. 5' In consideration of the paramount protections
provided by the Constitution, the second dissent concluded that Courts
should base their decisions on the presumption against waiver of
constitutional rights. 14
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, holding that
the determination by final agency decision maker Sherman did not
violate employee Hearne's due process rights to fair determination, may
have adverse affects on North Carolina government employees."
Although this holding is without precedential value, " any Court that
chooses to adopt the legal principles set forth in this opinion, will
essentially deprive employees of their constitutional due process
protection against biased agency determinations. In a system where
separation of powers and checks and balances are an integral part of the
governmental structure, this decision threatens the delicate balance of
power at the very foundation of our Constitution.
While this is not the first decision to raise the "peculiar
problem" of the decision maker assessing his or her own credibility, see
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S 134 (1974), it illustrates one of the merits
of a central panel system of administrative law determinations.
Whether Heame voluntarily resigned or was pressured into such action
may be a close question. Decisions on such close questions should
come from an unbiased decision maker, not the person who applied the
pressure. Compare, Goldberg v. Kelly,397 U.S. 254 (1970), which
required, for welfare cut offs, that the first person who decided to
terminate a welfare recipient could not be the hearing officer on such
a cut off. If nothing else, the very human tendency to resist confessing
an error had been made, militates against the procedure followed in
Hearne, [and Arnett]. A central panel system, with a final decision by
531d.
4Id.
SId. at 866-67.
"6Id. at 867.
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the central panel ALJ not only avoids any "rule of necessity" problem,
but also has the appearance of fairness.
The Judge Is Always Right@
Hearne v. Sherman, 516 S.E.2d 864 (N.C. 1999)*
This bizarre little case would finally turn
On whom to believe: Messrs. Sherman or Hearne.
Walter Hearne was a varmint control officer
Who, one day, sad to say, did some pups massacre.
And, as a result, as one might have well thought,
The general public was greatly distraught.
So, Wayne Sherman, his boss, was mightily ired
And gave Hearne a choice: to resign or be fired.
One way or the other, Mr. Hearne was soon gone.
But he then filed a suit claiming he'd been a pawn
Whom Sherman had sacked without cause or a hearing.
He wanted his job back, his name to be clearing.
ALJ Morrison conducted a trial.
He found it was Sherman whose actions were vile,
And that Hearne had indeed never willingly quit -
He must be reinstated as he was quite fit.
A state jobs commission affirmed every finding;
They ruled that Judge Morrison' s report ought be binding.
Now here's where the case becomes outright weird
As the "local authority" the issue next heard.
Robert E. Rains, Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University. The author wishes to thank his esteemed colleague,
Professor Susan Beth Farmer, for bringing this bizarre little case to this attention.
Reprinted by permission of the author and the Green Bag 2d, Winter 2000.
© 1999 Robert E. Rains. All rights reserved.
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And just who might that local authority be?
Why, none other than Sherman himself, it was he!
So, now acting as judge, Mr. Sherman decried:
At the trial either Sherman or Hearne must have lied.
I've reviewed all the facts and now I discern
That the witness who lied was, no doubt, Mr. Hearne.
And the one who was honest was, hmm, let me see,
That believable fellow was certainly ... me!
The lower decisions therefore lack support
And thus Hearne's appeal I must throw out of court.
I shan't bore you, dear readers, with all the details;
Suffice it to say, there were further appeals.
The state supreme court simply couldn' t decide
If Hearne's right to due process was somehow denied.
They were evenly split. They just couldn't determine
Whether Hearne had been wronged, thus upheld Mr. Sherman.
When you're witness and judge, keep this adage in view -
If you say so yourself, to thine own self be true.
And if someone should dare to suggest you have lied,
Then your own credibility you can decide.

